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BUYER POWER AND HEALTHCARE PRICES 
John B. Kirkwood
 
Abstract: One major reason why healthcare spending is much higher in America than in 
other countries is that our prices are exceptionally high. This Article addresses whether we 
ought to rely more heavily on buyer power to reduce those prices, as other nations do. It 
focuses on two sectors where greater buyer power could easily be exercised: prescription 
drugs covered by Medicare and hospital and physician services covered by private insurance. 
The Article concludes that the biggest buyer of all, the federal government, should be 
allowed to negotiate Medicare prescription drug prices. This would likely reduce the prices 
of many branded drugs substantially without causing a large reduction in innovation. 
Multiple studies indicate that drug companies have been exceptionally profitable in recent 
years. As a result, they could lower prices on many drugs and still earn a competitive return 
on most research and development. Moreover, the incentive to develop important new 
medicines would remain high because the government would have little leverage over the 
prices of these drugs. Finally, if problems with innovation develop, payments for new drugs 
can be increased. 
In contrast, encouraging large insurance companies to merge does not appear to be a 
promising way of lowering healthcare costs. While some large mergers may be 
procompetitive—lowering both excessive provider prices and insurance premiums—most 
would present significant competitive risks. They may allow the merged firm to exert 
monopsony power over small providers, they may create market power and lead to higher 
premiums, or they may permit the merged firm to gain a discriminatory advantage over 
smaller insurance companies, threatening downstream competition. Because of these 
dangers, it would not be wise, as a general rule, to permit large health insurers to merge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare prices in the United States are exceptionally high. Many 
studies have found that the United States spends nearly twice as much 
per capita on healthcare as other developed countries, while achieving 
inferior results on such important public health measures as life 
expectancy and infant mortality.
1
 When analysts try to explain why we 
spend more than other advanced nations, they frequently point to the 
higher prices we pay: many healthcare goods and services are more 
expensive in America than they are abroad.
2
 Medicare pays four times as 
                                                     
1. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 28 (2014) [hereinafter MEDPAC], http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar14_ 
entirereport.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/P8QJ-PV45]. 
The United States spends more on health care, both per capita and as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP), than any of the 34 countries that are members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). At the same time, the United States ranks 
26th in life expectancy and 31st on infant survival rates of the 34 OECD countries. 
Id.; see also Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://healthland.time.com/2013/02/20/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us 
[https://perma.cc/3W7G-TQZP] (“In the U.S., people spend almost 20% of the gross domestic 
product on health care, compared with about half that in most developed countries. Yet in every 
measurable way, the results our health care system produces are no better and often worse than the 
outcomes in those countries.”). 
2. See, e.g., MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 28 (“[H]igher U.S. spending levels are attributable to the 
nation’s significantly higher prices for health care services and not to greater utilization of hospital 
and physician services.”); EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 220 
(2014) (“Substantial research has shown that the prices paid for health care services in the United 
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much for CT scans as Germany does.
3
 The cost of a hip replacement in 
the United States is over five times the cost in Brussels and the U.S. 
price includes fewer services.
4
 Professor Emanuel notes: 
[a]merican physicians and nurses [earn] much more than their 
counterparts in Europe, Australia, and other developed 
countries. Prices for brand-name drugs—although not 
generics—are much higher in the United States than they are in 
other countries. Prices for routine tests, such as MRIs and CT 
scans, are higher in the United States than they are in Japan and 
other countries. For instance, an MRI in Japan is $160, while in 
the United States it averages $1,700.
5
 
Healthcare prices are not only high but have been rising rapidly for 
many years, faster than the overall rate of inflation. Between 2000 and 
2010, the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) accounted for by 
healthcare increased from 13.8% to 17.9%.
6
 “Much of this increase,” 
according to Professors Blair and Durrance, “can be attributed to rising 
                                                     
States are high.”); Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International Context, 
23 HEALTH AFF. 10, 12 (2004) (“Americans pay much higher prices for the same health services 
than citizens in other countries pay.”). High prices are not, however, the only cause of America’s 
relatively poor public health results. See Eduardo Porter, Income Inequality Is Costing the Nation on 
Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2015, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/business/ 
economy/income-inequality-is-costing-the-us-on-social-issues.html?_r=0 (“The United States has 
the highest teenage birthrate in the developed world—about seven times the rate in France, 
according to the O.E.C.D. More than one out of every four children lives with one parent, the 
largest percentage by far among industrialized nations. And more than a fifth live in poverty, sixth 
from the bottom among O.E.C.D. nations.”); see also id. at B8 (“American babies born to white, 
college-educated, married women survive as often as those born to advantaged women in Europe. 
It’s the babies born to nonwhite, nonmarried, nonprosperous women who die so young.”). 
3. Brill, supra note 1. 
4. Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Patents, Monopoly Pricing, and Antitrust in 
Health Care Markets, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2014, at 1, 2 (citing Elisabeth Rosenthal, For 
Medical Tourists, Simple Math, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at A1). 
5. EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 220–21; see also Brill, supra note 1 (“McKinsey & Co. researchers 
reported that overall prescription-drug prices in the U.S. are ‘50% higher for comparable products’ 
than in other developed countries.”); MARC-ANDRÉ GAGNON & SIDNEY WOLFE, MIRROR, MIRROR 
ON THE WALL: MEDICARE PART D PAYS NEEDLESSLY HIGH BRAND-NAME DRUG PRICES 
COMPARED WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES AND WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 7 (2015) 
(new data indicate that in 2014 the median OECD price on patented drugs was only forty-two 
percent of the U.S. price); Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More than Other Countries for 
Drugs: Norway and Other State-Run Health Systems Drive Hard Bargains, and Are Willing to Say 
No to Costly Therapy, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s-pays-
more-than-other-countries-for-drugs-1448939481 [https://perma.cc/U823-REDQ] (“A vial of the 
cancer drug Rituxan cost Norway’s taxpayer-funded health system $1,527 in the third quarter of 
2015, while the U.S. Medicare program paid $3,678. An injection of the asthma drug Xolair cost 
Norway $463, which was 46% less than Medicare paid for it.”). 
6. Blair & Durrance, supra note 4, at 1. 
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prices.”7 From 2000 to 2013, the consumer price index increased by 
35%, while the medical component increased by 63%.
8
 Although 
healthcare inflation has slowed recently, it is likely to pick up again as 
the economy improves.
9
 One notable cause is the escalating prices of 
new brand name prescription drugs. Kalydeco, a new specialty drug, 
now costs more than $300,000 a year,
10
 and UnitedHealth Group has 
estimated that specialty drug spending could quadruple in less than a 
decade, from $87 billion in 2012 to $400 billion in 2020.
11
 Similarly, the 
prices of anticancer drugs have soared, with new treatments now costing 
more than ten times what they cost two decades ago, but with the 
benefits—additional survival time—often stated in months rather than 
years.
12
 Finally, as Turing’s notorious 5400% increase in the price of 
Daraprim quickly demonstrated, there is “growing concern about huge 
price increases on older drugs, some of them generic, that have long 
been mainstays of treatment.”13 Together, these developments have 
generated “public outrage against the growing trend of higher and higher 
drug prices imposed by big drug companies.”14 
                                                     
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See Ezekiel Emanuel & Topher Spiro, The Coming Health-Care Cost Shock, WALL ST. J., July 
8, 2015, at A11; Margot Sanger-Katz, Health Spending Is Expected to Rise as Slowdown Ends, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2015, at B2. But see David Brooks, Great News! We’re Not Doomed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2015, at A27 (“We seem to be making at least some incremental progress toward a 
structural reduction in health care inflation.”). 
10. Joe Nocera, The $300,000 Drug, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014, at A19. 
11. Joseph Walker, A Costly Drug Is Denied, and Medicaid Takes Heat, WALL ST. J., July 17, 
2014, at A1; see also Karen Ignagni, Paying for the Thousand-Dollar Pill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 
2014, at A11 (“Specialty drugs, which only make up 1% of prescriptions, already account for 25% 
of total U.S. drug spending, moving toward 50%.”). 
12. See Hagop Kantarjian et al., High Cancer Prices in the United States: Reasons and Proposed 
Solutions, 10 J. ONCOLOGY. PRAC. 208, 208 (2014). 
The average cancer drug price for approximately 1 year of therapy or a total treatment duration 
was less than $10,000 before 2000, and had increased to $30,000 to $50,000 by 2005. In 2012, 
12 of the 13 new drugs approved for cancer indications were priced above $100,000 per year of 
therapy. 
Id.; David H. Howard et al., Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 
140 (2015) (finding that “the average launch price of anticancer drugs, adjusted for inflation and 
health benefits, increased by 10 percent annually—or an average of $8,500 per year—from 1995 to 
2013”); id. at 141 (“Gains in survival time associated with recently approved anticancer drugs are 
typically measured in months, not years.”). 
13. Andrew Pollack, Once a Neglected Treatment, Now an Expensive Specialty Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2015, at B1 (noting that Turing raised Daraprim’s price to “$750 a table from 
$13.50” and that “Cycloserine, a drug used to treat dangerous multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, was 
just increased in price to $10,800 for 30 pills from $500 after its acquisition by Rodelis 
Therapeutics”). 
14. Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, A Drug Company’s Price Tactics Pinch Insurers and 
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America’s high and rising healthcare prices spring from many causes. 
Among them are the continuing introduction of more effective—but 
more expensive—treatments; widespread insurance coverage, which 
reduces the incentive to look for low-cost providers; the absence of 
transparent pricing information, which inhibits the search for those 
providers; and patent protection for pharmaceuticals, which blocks for 
years the emergence of low-cost competitors.
15
 These causes, moreover, 
contribute to another: the market power of providers.
16
 As the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission noted, “[o]ne key driver of higher prices 
in the United States is provider market power. Hospitals merge and 
physician groups consolidate to gain market power over insurers to 
negotiate higher payment rates.”17 Such power is a pervasive feature of 
healthcare markets, enabling many hospitals, physician groups, and 
manufacturers of patented drugs to charge more or provide less than a 
competitive market would permit.
18
 
At the same time, the market power of providers is limited by power 
on the other side of the market—by buyer power.19 Differences in buyer 
power help explain why Americans pay higher prices for healthcare than 
consumers in other developed countries. As Reinhardt, Hussey, and 
Anderson point out, in some countries, all healthcare purchases are made 
by a single buyer (the government); in others, there are multiple 
purchasers but they are allowed to bargain collectively; and both 
techniques yield lower prices than the American system, which utilizes 
multiple payers in both the public sector (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) 
and the private (e.g., insurance companies and employers).
20
 
                                                     
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at A1; see also Joseph Walker, Price Increases Drive Drug 
Firms’ Revenue¸ WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2015, at A1 (“For 20 leading global drug companies last year, 
80% of growth in net profits stemmed from price increases in the U.S., according to a May report by 
Credit Suisse.”). 
15. See HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA’S HEALTH 
CARE 9, 25, 48–49 (1991); EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 39, 89, 115. 
16. Market power is the “ability to price profitably above the competitive level.” DENNIS W. 
CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8 (3d ed. 2000). 
17. MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 28. 
18. See infra Parts I & II. 
19. Buyer power is the “ability of a buyer to depress the price it pays a supplier or obtain more 
favorable nonprice terms.” John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 1485, 1493 (2012). 
20. See Reinhardt et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
[M]ultiple purchasers of care allow U.S. prices to rise above the level attained in other 
industrialized countries that either endow the demand side of their health systems with strong, 
monopsonistic (single-buyer) market power (such as the Canadian provincial health plans) or 
allow multipayer systems to bargain collectively with the providers of health care, sometimes 
within government-set overall health care budgets (as, for example, in Germany). 
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Differences in buyer power are also critical to understanding why 
different categories of purchaser (or third-party payer) are charged 
different prices for the same product or service.
21
 Consider prescription 
drugs, where price discrimination is endemic. The federal government 
obtains the lowest prices when it buys for the Department of Defense 
(DOD) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
22
 Uninsured 
consumers pay the highest prices, since they must pay cash and have no 
buyer power at all.
23
 In between are health plans and self-insured 
employers, who exert varying degrees of leverage, depending on their 
size and the market power of the drug.
24
 Professor Reinhardt concludes: 
“[t]oday’s system of price discrimination in US health care . . . appears 
to reflect mainly the relative bargaining power . . . of those who pay for 
health care and those who provide it.”25 
This pattern, both internationally and within the United States, 
suggests that America ought to take greater advantage of buyer power. 
By allowing buyers to combine, or letting the biggest buyer of all, the 
federal government, play a larger role in setting national healthcare 
prices, the country could reduce healthcare costs and achieve all the 
benefits that would entail, including greater access to services, lower 
federal budget deficits,
26
 higher wages and salaries,
27
 and fewer 
                                                     
Id. 
21. See Richard G. Frank, Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some Pay More than Others Do?, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 115, 121 (2001) (noting that price differentials “represent unequal bargaining 
power across different classes of purchasers”). 
22. See id. at 117 (“The federal supply schedule and the prices negotiated off of that schedule by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Defense Department tend to be the lowest prices 
in the land (58 percent of the cash/drugstore price).”). 
23. Id. (“Cash payers pay the highest prices.”); see also Brill, supra note 1 (“If you are confused 
by the notion that those least able to pay are the ones singled out to pay the highest rates, welcome 
to the American medical marketplace.”). 
24. See Frank, supra note 21, at 117 (“Institutional buyers . . . realize price concessions from 
manufacturers of 5–30 percent of the amount paid by cash payers.”). 
25. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory 
of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2129 
(2011). 
26. Many commentators have emphasized that, if federal spending on healthcare continues to 
increase, it will lead to unsustainable budget deficits, crowd out spending on other national 
priorities, or both. See, e.g., Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing Health 
Care Spending, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 949 (2012). 
National health spending is projected to continue to grow faster than the economy, increasing 
from 18% to about 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2037. Federal health spending 
is projected to increase from 25% to approximately 40% of total federal spending by 2037. 
These trends could squeeze out critical investments in education and infrastructure [and] 
contribute to unsustainable debt levels . . . . 
Id.; see also MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 3 (“If [healthcare] spending continues to consume an 
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instances of extreme financial hardship.
28
 Indeed, the country could 
maximize the benefits of buyer power by moving to a “single payer” 
system, in which the federal government is the sole purchaser of 
healthcare goods and services for the entire population. 
But buyer power is a double-edged sword. By depressing provider 
prices, a large buyer could reduce the incentives of providers to enter the 
market, to develop new treatments, or to maintain quality, harming 
rather than benefiting consumers.
29
 By inducing discriminatory prices 
from suppliers, a large buyer could gain a competitive advantage over 
smaller rivals, weaken or destroy them, and then raise prices or limit 
choice.
30
 Likewise, if two buyers merge to gain more buyer power, they 
may also acquire market power as sellers, diminishing competition 
downstream and harming consumers. 
This Article examines whether greater buyer power is desirable for 
consumers in two major sectors of the healthcare industry. The first, 
prescription drugs covered by Medicare, is the subject of Part I. 
Currently, the federal government is prohibited from using its 
considerable purchasing leverage to obtain lower prices from drug 
manufacturers. Part I asks whether this ban on federal negotiation should 
be repealed, as both President Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton have 
proposed.
31
 Part II turns to hospitals and physicians covered by private 
insurance and asks whether insurance companies ought to be allowed to 
merge so they can bargain more effectively with these providers. As 
                                                     
increasing share of federal and state budgets, spending for other public priorities . . . will be 
crowded out . . . .”); Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be Negotiated 
Under Part D of Medicare? And If So, How?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 33, 36 (2008) (“[T]he growth of 
Medicare and Medicaid will continue to place enormous strains on the budget.”). 
27. See Emanuel et al., supra note 26, at 949 (finding that future increases in healthcare spending 
could “constrain wage increases for the middle class”). 
28. Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 2129 (“Today’s system . . . can saddle uninsured middle-class 
Americans, who have the least bargaining power, with very high prices and great financial 
hardship.”). 
29. In healthcare, these harms—to quality, choice, or innovation—are not just pocketbook 
matters. 
30. According to the chief antitrust economist at the Department of Justice, the Antitrust Division 
staff opposed the Comcast/Time Warner Cable merger in significant part because it would have 
compounded the parties’ ability to induce such discriminatory advantages. See Jeff Bliss, Large 
Cable Companies’ Contract Terms Helped Turn DOJ Against Comcast-TWC, Agency Economist 
Says, MLEX, June 15, 2015.  
31. See David Morgan, Obama Administration Seeks to Negotiate Medicare Drug Prices, 
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/us-usa-budget-medicare-
idUSKBN0L61OW20150202 [https://perma.cc/DY33-JB2C]; Sarah Kliff, After Obamacare, 
Democrats Turn to Prescription Drug Prices as Health-Care Priority, VOX (Sept. 22, 2015, 6:10 
AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/22/9368489/clinton-drug-prices  [https://perma.cc/5C8E-MJEC].  
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many commentators have noted, this could benefit consumers by forcing 
hospitals and physician groups with market power to lower their prices.
32
 
In brief, my conclusions are the following: 
Federal Negotiation. Congress ought to allow the federal government 
to negotiate the prices of prescription drugs provided by Medicare. To 
make those negotiations effective, the federal government should have 
the power to exclude drugs from the program, or cover them less 
favorably, if the manufacturer fails to offer a substantial discount. This 
process would substantially reduce the cost of many patented, brand 
name drugs and save taxpayers and consumers billions of dollars a year, 
as experience in Europe and with federal procurement in the United 
States indicates. But the step would not be cost free. By lowering the 
profitability of many of these drugs, it would reduce the incentive to 
develop them. This effect is unlikely to be large, however, because the 
federal government funds most basic scientific research, the incentive to 
develop unique and important new drugs would remain high because the 
government would have little leverage over their prices, and branded 
drug makers appear to have been exceptionally profitable in recent 
years. If so, many drug prices could be lowered without depriving the 
drug makers of a competitive return on most research and development 
(R&D) projects. Moreover, if problems do develop with new drug 
development, payments could be increased. 
Mergers of Insurance Companies. Some combinations of health 
insurers may be procompetitive. By merging they can enlarge their 
countervailing power as buyers and force hospitals and physician groups 
with market power to lower their prices. And if the downstream market 
remains competitive, the merged firm is likely to pass on these savings 
in the form of lower co-payments and lower premiums. But a merger 
that is large enough to increase buyer power significantly may harm 
competition in multiple ways. First, it may create monopsony power and 
enable the merged firm to exploit small, competitive providers.
33
 
Second, the merger may create downstream market power, which could 
offset the desirable effects of countervailing power and raise premiums 
                                                     
32. See, e.g., Victor R. Fuchs & Peter V. Lee, A Healthy Side of Insurer Mega-Mergers, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2015, at A13 (“The greater efficiency and market power of larger insurance plans 
could lower prices for consumers by offsetting the bargaining power of health-care providers.”); 
Anna Wilde Mathews & Christopher Weaver, Health Mergers Could Cut Consumer Options, WALL 
ST. J., June 22, 2015, at A1 (“Many experts have said that [mergers of hospitals] can drive higher 
rates—and that more-powerful insurers might have a better chance of countering them and striking 
pacts for new forms of payment that incentivize efficiency.”). 
33. Monopsony power is the “ability to profitably set wages (or other input prices) below 
competitive levels.” CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 106. 
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to consumers. Finally, the merger might create countervailing power, but 
the merged firm might exercise it in anticompetitive ways, harming 
consumers or small providers.
34
 Because a merger of large insurance 
companies is likely to present one or more of these competitive risks, 
allowing these mergers is not a promising way of lowering healthcare 
costs. 
I. FEDERAL NEGOTIATION OF MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG PRICES 
When the federal government purchases prescription drugs for the 
DOD or the VA, it determines the prices it will pay for these drugs by 
negotiating with pharmaceutical manufacturers.
35
 But when drugs are 
procured for Medicare, a much larger program with much larger 
consequences for the federal budget, the government plays no role in 
setting prices. Congress has prohibited the federal government from 
negotiating Medicare prescription drug prices.
36
 This Part of the Article 
examines that controversial prohibition. It first reviews the dynamics of 
current pricing and then assesses the advantages and disadvantages of 
allowing the federal government to wield its purchasing power. 
The Article focuses on patented brand name drugs because they are 
the most expensive prescription drugs sold in the United States. Generic 
drugs, by contrast, are generally much cheaper. Indeed, it may be fair to 
say that there are two drug industries in this country. In the first, made 
up of patented branded drugs, prices are determined not by the cost of 
producing or developing a drug, but by the therapeutic advantage of a 
drug relative to other drugs on the market. Over time, this value-based 
pricing has led to high and rising charges for new brand name drugs. In 
the second industry, made up of generic drugs, prices are determined 
primarily by the number of producers and their costs. As additional 
producers enter the market for a particular generic, prices are driven 
closer to marginal cost. With relatively free entry, that has meant low 
                                                     
34. As this summary suggests, it is important in analyzing buyer power to distinguish monopsony 
power from countervailing power. Monopsony power is the kind of power that a dominant buyer 
exerts against small, competitive suppliers. Countervailing power, in contrast, is the kind of power 
that a substantial buyer exercises against suppliers with market power. The distinction is significant 
because the two types of power frequently have different effects, with monopsony power (unless 
justified as a reward for superior performance) generally harmful, and countervailing power 
usually—but not always—beneficial. For a more detailed explanation, see infra note 43.  
35. See infra notes 65–66. 
36. See infra Section I.A.1. 
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prices for the typical generic drug.
37
 
A. Current Pharmaceutical Pricing Under Medicare 
1. Prohibition on Federal Negotiation 
Congress has barred the federal government from exerting its buyer 
power to procure cheaper prescription drugs for Medicare. Instead, 
“Medicare is a price taker: the price is set by the drug companies, and 
Medicare has no flexibility or negotiating power to pay a lower price.”38 
Congress has achieved this result in two ways. Under Medicare Part B, 
which covers physician visits and other nonhospital services, the price 
for drugs administered in a doctor’s office is determined by the average 
sales price in the previous quarter.
39
 In essence, what drug companies 
charged the prior quarter determines what they can charge this quarter. 
Under Medicare Part D, the much larger and more general prescription 
drug benefit, prices are fixed through negotiations between private 
prescription drug plans (PDPs) and drug manufacturers. The federal 
government cannot interfere with this process.
40
 In neither Part B nor 
Part D, therefore, can the government wield its bargaining leverage, 
threatening to withhold or limit purchases in order to obtain lower 
prices. 
In contrast, as the following Section explains, PDPs regularly utilize 
                                                     
37. I am indebted to Professor Comanor for this description of the prescription drug sector. For 
two of his significant contributions, see Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of 
New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 108 (1998); William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, 
Mergers and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 106 (2013). As 
Comanor and Scherer stress, generic drug use has grown enormously in the last three decades. See 
id. at 106 (“Generic fulfillment of prescriptions has risen from 17 percent in 1980 and 30 percent in 
1990 to upwards of 70 percent by number in 2009.”). Competition in the generic industry, 
moreover, has given the United States the lowest generic prices in the world. See Patricia M. 
Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, International Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals in 2005, 
27 HEALTH AFF. 221, 232 (2008). 
38. EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 60 (referring to Medicare Part B); see also Thomas F. Cotter, 
Patents, Antitrust and the High Cost of Health Care, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2014, at 1, 9–10 
(“Congress has specifically forbidden Medicare from negotiating favorable prices for prescription 
drugs in the manner of national health services elsewhere.” (referring to Medicare Part D)). 
39. See EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 60; Whalen, supra note 5 (“The arrangement means Medicare 
is essentially forfeiting its buying power, leaving bargaining to doctors’ offices that have little 
negotiating heft, said Sean Sullivan, dean of the School of Pharmacy at the University of 
Washington.”). 
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary . . . (1) may not interfere with the 
negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and (2) may not 
require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D 
drugs.”). 
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their buyer power to induce discounts from the drug companies. 
Moreover, the discounts they have obtained are significant, even though 
no plan commands the volume of business the federal government would 
control if it were the sole purchaser of prescription drugs for Medicare. 
2. Price Reductions from Private Plan Negotiations 
As noted, Medicare relies on private insurance companies to provide 
its general prescription drug benefit (Part D). Instead of assigning drug 
procurement to the government, as other developed countries do, 
Medicare allows private plans to decide which drugs to cover (subject to 
significant exceptions) and how much to pay for them. To keep 
premiums down, Medicare subsidizes these PDPs.
41
 The plans compete 
among themselves to sell coverage to seniors and try to reduce their 
costs (and the payments of their subscribers) by negotiating better deals 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers.
42
 
The prime method they use to negotiate better deals is the method that 
large buyers have long used to extract concessions from a supplier with 
market power: they promise to bring additional business if the supplier 
cuts price or threaten to withhold business if it refuses.
43
 This method 
                                                     
41. See Mark Duggan & Fiona Scott Morton, The Effect of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical 
Prices and Utilization, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 590, 591 (2010) (“Governments outside the United 
States use their power as large buyers to pay relatively low prices for new, patent-protected 
medications. In contrast, Part D is set up so that the government does not directly purchase drugs, 
but rather subsidizes participating private prescription drug plans.”). 
42. See id.  
43. See, e.g., Frank & Newhouse, supra note 26, at 35 (“[T]he drug insurance plan can obtain a 
favorable price by steering purchasing volume to particular products over others in response to 
manufacturers’ price offers.”). When a substantial buyer obtains a discount from a supplier with 
market power by playing that supplier off against other suppliers, the buyer is exerting 
countervailing power, not monopsony power. For a discussion of the two types of buyer power, 
describing their nature, prerequisites, and effects, see Kirkwood, supra note 19, at 1493–1512.  
In brief, monopsony power is the classic form of buyer power, modeled in economic textbooks as 
the mirror image of monopoly power. In the textbook monopsony model, a single buyer purchases 
from atomistically competitive suppliers, each without market power and each producing on an 
upward-sloping marginal cost curve. The monopsonist maximizes its profits by depressing its 
purchase price below the competitive level and the suppliers respond by reducing their output. See 
id. at 1495–1500.  
In contrast, countervailing power is the type of buyer power that is wielded against a supplier 
with market power. In response, the supplier frequently lowers its price closer to the competitive 
level, which often causes the buyer to lower its price as well, increasing output and benefiting 
consumers. But the exercise of countervailing power is not always procompetitive. There are many 
ways in which it could harm consumers and several ways in which it could result in the creation of 
monopsony power and the exploitation of powerless suppliers. See id. at 1500–12. These two types 
of buyer power are polar models and neither type may fit a particular market exactly. But it is highly 
useful, in analyzing buyer power, to be aware of the two types, for the effects of buyer power may 
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works with brand name prescription drug makers because they typically 
exercise market power. Their branded drugs are differentiated from other 
drugs, sometimes sharply, while they remain on patent.
44
 Moreover, 
even when their patented drugs face relatively close substitutes, they 
often face just a few.
45
 As a result, the manufacturer can price them 
above marginal cost, sometimes far above marginal cost. Indeed, brand 
name pharmaceuticals are a well-known example of a high fixed cost, 
low marginal cost industry, with high fixed costs of research and 
development, and low marginal costs of production.
46
 
With this cost structure, a manufacturer is vulnerable to a large buyer 
that can make a credible commitment to move business in response to 
the manufacturer’s pricing. Suppose, for example, that the buyer 
promises to bring additional business if the manufacturer lowers its price 
on that business. If this promise is credible, the manufacturer is likely to 
accede, so long as the lower price is above marginal cost, because the 
additional business would increase its profits. Suppose, instead, that the 
buyer threatens to withdraw its existing business unless the manufacturer 
lowers its price. If this threat is credible, the manufacturer is likely to cut 
the price, assuming the lower price is above marginal cost, since it 
makes more sense to accept a reduction in profits than lose all the 
buyer’s business. 
The principal device that health plans use to move business is a 
formulary. This is simply a list of the drugs that a plan covers, but it is 
an effective tool for bringing business to or removing business from a 
drug manufacturer. By adding a drug to its formulary, a PDP can 
                                                     
differ considerably depending on whether the power is exerted against small suppliers pricing 
competitively or large suppliers with market power. See id. at 1495 n.34. 
44. This differentiation is greatest where a drug has no therapeutic substitutes. See infra notes 58–
60 and accompanying text (indicating that drugs with no substitutes command higher prices).  
45. Moreover, a prescribing doctor may give little weight to price in deciding which of a group of 
patented drugs to choose for a patient, further reducing each manufacturer’s incentive to cut price. 
46. See Frank & Newhouse, supra note 26, at 34 (“Most prescription drugs can be produced for 
‘pennies a pill,’ but developing new and important pharmaceutical agents is a costly, time-
consuming, and risky enterprise requiring a substantial up-front investment of capital.”); Joseph P. 
Newhouse, How Much Should Medicare Pay for Drugs?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 89, 92 (2004) (“The 
industry’s fixed costs are high relative to its marginal costs . . . . Once production begins, the 
marginal cost of producing another pill is typically negligible.”). 
Given this cost structure, incremental sales are highly profitable, which creates a powerful 
incentive to generate additional sales. As a result, “incentives to invest heavily in marketing are 
substantial, something for which pharmaceutical manufacturers are notorious.” Ernst R. Berndt et 
al., A Primer on the Economics of Prescription Pharmaceutical Pricing in Health Insurance 
Markets, F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y, Nov. 2011, at 1, 3 n.6. Indeed, it is common to note that 
brand name drug manufacturers spend more on marketing than they do on R&D. 
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increase the manufacturer’s sales of that drug. By removing a drug, the 
plan can reduce the manufacturer’s business, sometimes sharply.47 
Today, plans are increasingly using tiered formularies, in which lower 
tiers offer lower co-payments.
48
 Since lower co-pays reduce the out-of-
pocket costs a consumer incurs, they generally lead to greater sales.
49
 As 
a result, the negotiations between a PDP and a drug company are not 
only over whether a drug should be listed on the formulary but what tier 
it should be on.
50
 
Government regulations limit this bargaining in an important way. 
Rules issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
require PDPs to cover at least two drugs in every therapeutic category 
and, in certain categories, to cover essentially all drugs.
51
 In those six, 
all-inclusive categories, a PDP cannot threaten to drop a drug from its 
formulary if the manufacturer refuses to provide a discount. The plan 
can only threaten to move the drug to a higher tier.
52
 This significantly 
reduces the plan’s bargaining leverage.53 
Where PDPs can remove a drug from their formulary, they have been 
able to obtain significant discounts, even though no PDP has the 
leverage the federal government would have if it were the sole purchaser 
of prescription drugs for Medicare. Two studies have demonstrated the 
buying power of these private plans. Professors Duggan and Morton 
                                                     
47. See, e.g., infra note 61.  
48. See Charles Orenstein, Those Rising Co-Payments for Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2014, at B6 (“Insurance plans with multiple cost tiers have become more prevalent in recent 
years. . . . By 2013 . . . more than eight in 10 workers had private insurance plans with three or more 
tiers of drug prices.”). 
49. Berndt et al., supra note 46, at 15 (“[L]ower patient copayments increas[e] the quantity 
demanded of the drug.”); see also id. at 20 (“The insurer increases its bargaining power by limiting 
the number of preferred brands, and by lowering the copayment for the preferred tier. Each of these 
contribute to its power to ‘move market share’ to the preferred drug.”). 
50. See id. at 15 (noting that “if the manufacturer insists on a high drug price it risks banishment 
to the third tier, where patients have the largest copayment, or not even being on the formulary, in 
which case the consumer pays the entire price out-of-pocket”). 
51. MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 381 (“For most drug classes, CMS requires plan formularies to 
cover—in every therapeutic class and key drug type—at least two drugs that are not therapeutic 
substitutes, unless only one drug is approved for that class. . . . For six drug classes, CMS requires 
Part D plans to cover ‘all or substantially all’ drugs in the class.”). These requirements benefit 
consumers by broadening the number of covered drugs. As the text explains, however, they also 
tend to raise the prices that PDPs and consumers pay.  
52. See id. Plans can also try to limit use of these drugs through prior authorization requirements 
or step therapy. Duggan & Morton, supra note 41, at 603. 
53. See Duggan & Morton, supra note 41, at 603 (“The ability to exclude [drugs] from the 
formulary provides . . .  potentially important leverage . . . .”). Thus, while the CMS requirements 
give consumers a broader choice of drugs, they come at a significant cost.  
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found that during the first year of Part D’s operation, the prices of drugs 
used principally by Medicare recipients “declined by approximately 10 
percent in real terms while those for other consumers increased by 12 
percent.”54 As the authors note, these results “strongly suggest that Part 
D plans have succeeded in negotiating lower price increases for Part D 
enrollees—approximately 20 percent lower than they otherwise would 
have been.”55 Likewise, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MEDPAC) found that where PDPs could exercise their purchasing 
leverage, they obtained substantial savings. Looking at the six-year 
period from 2006 through 2011, MEDPAC reported that the prices for 
multisource brand name drugs increased 44% whereas prices for single 
source brand name drugs increased 66%.
56
 This twenty-two point 
difference represents the difference between cases in which PDPs could 
play suppliers off against each other and cases in which they could not.
57
 
As this result suggests, neither study uncovered substantial price 
effects when it focused on drugs that a PDP could not exclude from its 
formulary, either because the drug had no substitute or because all the 
drugs in a therapeutic category had to be covered. Duggan and Morton 
state: “Our analyses show that prices do not decline in relative terms for 
brands with zero or only one substitute in a class.”58 Moreover, as just 
noted, MEDPAC found that single-source brand name drugs 
experienced substantially higher price increases than multisource brand 
name drugs.
59
 The Commission stated: “the prices for unique drugs and 
biologics have grown rapidly. Because those products lack clear 
substitutes, [PDPs] have little leverage for price negotiations.”60 
In short, where three or more branded drugs are therapeutic 
substitutes, PDPs have been able to negotiate significant discounts. But 
where the upstream market structure is a monopoly or duopoly, private 
plans have exerted little power. 
                                                     
54. Id. at 602. 
55. Id. at 605. 
56. See MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 384 fig.14-6. 
57. See id. 
58. Duggan & Morton, supra note 41, at 592 (noting that PDPs were “required to cover all drugs 
in small classes”).  
59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
60. See MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 362–63; Frank & Newhouse, supra note 26, at 37 (“In the 
case of prescription drugs without good substitutes, PDPs are in a weak bargaining position . . . .”). 
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B. Federal Negotiation of Medicare Drug Prices 
If the federal government were the sole purchaser of prescription 
drugs for Medicare, it would control much more business than any single 
PDP now commands, enabling it to wield much greater buyer power 
and, where substitutes are available, obtain substantially lower prices. At 
the same time, though, these lower prices, or the tactics used to obtain 
them, could have significant adverse effects. They could reduce the 
variety of drugs available to Medicare beneficiaries or the number of 
new drugs introduced. The following Sections address the impact of 
federal negotiation of Medicare prescription drug prices on price levels, 
choice of drugs, and new drug development.
61
 
1. Price Levels 
If the government could establish a single Medicare formulary and 
credibly threaten to exclude particular drugs from that formulary, it is 
likely to obtain discounts that exceed, by a substantial margin, what 
PDPs now negotiate. Two principal reasons support this conclusion. 
First, the prices of brand name drugs are much lower in other developed 
countries than they are in the United States,
62
 principally because 
governments in those countries negotiate or set prices.
63
 Since Medicare 
is larger than the entire health sectors of many countries,
64
 the U.S. 
government is likely to exert at least as much buyer power. Second, 
when the federal government purchases drugs for a major program, as it 
does for the DOD and VA, it receives the cheapest prices in the 
country.
65
 Indeed, drugs procured for DOD and VA are often priced 15% 
                                                     
61. Federal negotiation of Medicare prescription drug prices could have other adverse effects. It 
could raise the administrative costs of procuring prescription drugs for Medicare or, because the 
federal government is more subject to political influence than private health plans, it could reduce 
the efficiency of the program. While a thorough exploration of both issues is beyond the scope of 
this Article, neither possibility appears to pose a serious obstacle. No article, white paper, or other 
source reviewed for this Article contended that the administrative costs of federal negotiation would 
be high or that political influence would undermine the value of the program. 
62. See Nicole Woo & Dean Baker, State Savings with an Efficient Medicare Prescription Drug 
Benefit, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. ISSUE BRIEF, Mar. 2013, at 1 (“Canada spends a bit over 70 
cents for each dollar spent in the United Sates per person on prescription drugs. The United 
Kingdom spends just under 40 cents, and Denmark only about 35 cents.”); supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. 
63. Woo & Baker, supra note 62, at 1 (“The reason that other countries spend so much less on 
drugs is that their governments negotiate prices with the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
64. Id. (“Medicare . . . also provides a huge market, actually far larger than many other 
countries.”). 
65. See Frank, supra note 21, at 117 (“The federal supply schedule and the prices negotiated off 
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to 60% below their Part D prices.
66
 
To be sure, the pharmaceutical manufacturers would resist such a 
major threat to their profits and attempt to compensate by reducing the 
discounts they offer to health plans in the private sector.
67
 Such cost 
shifting, however, is unlikely to eliminate the gains to consumers from 
federal negotiation. Studies of cost shifting by hospitals have found that 
they generally recover part of their losses from lower Medicare 
reimbursements by raising prices to private payers, but the offset is 
nowhere near complete.
68
 It seems fair to predict, therefore, that on 
many drugs the federal government would be able to obtain discounts 
that substantially exceed what PDPs now extract, though a portion of 
these price reductions would be wiped out by higher prices in the private 
sector.
69
 
                                                     
of that schedule by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Defense Department tend to be 
the lowest prices in the land (58 percent of the cash/drugstore price).”). 
66. See id. at 122 (by limiting the number of drugs it covered, the VA secured “price concessions 
of 16–41 percent below the federal price that already was among the lowest in the nation”); 
GAGNON & WOLFE, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “on average, a brand-name drug that costs $83 
under Medicare Part D would cost $48 under Medicaid and $46 under [VA]”); Walid F. Gellad et 
al., What If the Federal Government Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices for Seniors? An Estimate of 
National Savings, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1435 (2008) (“A report by Families USA, which 
looked at the top 20 drugs prescribed to seniors, found that VA prices were substantially lower than 
the cheapest Part D plans, with a median price difference of 58%.”). 
67. See Gellad et al., supra note 66, at 1439 (noting that drug manufacturers would likely react to 
lower Medicare prices “with higher prices for cash-paying customers and private health plans”); 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Solution to Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2015, at A31 (same). 
68. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 
MILBANK Q. 90, 92 (2011) (indicating that cost shifting occurs, though far below dollar-for-dollar 
levels); Vivian Y. Wu, Hospital Cost Shifting Revisited: New Evidence from the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997, 10 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 61 (2010) (finding that cost shifting from 
Medicare to private payers is lower in markets with a greater proportion of for-profit hospitals, but 
overall about twenty-one percent of Medicare payment reductions are shifted to private payers); see 
also Kirkwood, supra note 19, at 1545 n.243 (describing additional studies).  
69. As Emanuel points out, the government would not have to worry about cost shifting it if set 
prescription drug prices for the entire health care sector, not just Medicare. See Emanuel, supra note 
67. But such a step, which would bring the nation closer to a single-payer model, would pose 
considerably greater risks to consumer choice and innovation. Thus, while single payer may be the 
ultimate solution, it seems prudent to move incrementally at first and see how that works out before 
greatly expanding the government’s role.  
Likewise, it seems unwise to apply the Medicaid approach to Medicare—that is, require the 
prescription drug makers to provide fixed rebates on all drugs furnished to Medicare, as they are 
required to do for Medicaid. While this would produce lower prices, see Robert Pear, Medicaid 
Pays Less than Medicare for Many Prescription Drugs, U.S. Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16drug.html, it would also pose significant dangers 
to innovation. If the rebates were set too high, they would deprive drug makers of an adequate 
return on the vast bulk of their R&D. Fixed rebates, moreover, would not enable the government to 
provide greater rewards to more important therapeutic advances. In contrast, federal negotiation 
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The federal government’s leverage would be much more limited on 
drugs that are the only treatment in a therapeutic category. As noted 
above, PDPs have been unable to induce significant discounts on such 
drugs.
70
 While the federal government could threaten to place a sole-
source drug on a higher tier of its formulary, private plans do that now 
with relatively little effect. Total exclusion from the formulary has much 
greater impact. As officials at Sloan Kettering and Express Scripts have 
observed, it is the ability to deny coverage altogether—to say no to a 
particular drug—that produces the greatest discounts.71 If the federal 
government cannot say no to a drug because it is the only cure for a 
serious disease, it is unlikely to obtain any significant price reduction. 
Indeed, as Professor Newhouse has pointed out, if the federal 
government cannot say no, the manufacturer may charge “an abusive 
supply price.”72 
In sum, federal negotiation of prescription drug prices for Medicare is 
likely to produce substantial discounts on drugs that face multiple 
substitutes. This would save the government—and taxpayers—billions 
of dollars a year,
73
 though these savings would be partly offset by cost 
shifting to private payers. In contrast, where a drug has no therapeutic 
substitute, the government could not exclude it from its formulary. The 
government might be able to assign the drug to a higher tier, or limit 
coverage to patients with a proven need for it, but it could not, in today’s 
                                                     
would automatically do so, since, as explained below, the more important and unique the new drug, 
the less leverage the government would have over its price. These reasons help explain why federal 
negotiation of prescription drug prices is preferable, at least initially, to federal regulation of drug 
prices. 
70. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
71. See Peter B. Bach, Why Drugs Cost So Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2015, at A25 (stating that 
European countries have achieved major price reductions by saying “no to a handful of drugs each 
year,” that “[s]aying no, or even the threat, works to lower prices in the United States, too,” and that 
after Sloan Kettering refused to give Zaltrap to its patients, the manufacturer “halved its price 
nationwide”); Andrew Pollack, Health Insurers Are Pushing Back on Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2014, at A1, A3 (finding that after Express Scripts excluded Advair from its formulary, its 
“sales in the United States plummeted 30 percent in the first quarter, while sales of AstraZeneca’s 
Symbicort, a rival that remained on the formulary, grew 20 percent”). 
72. Newhouse, supra note 46, at 92. As Newhouse points out, Congress could reduce this 
problem by requiring compulsory arbitration of the prices of major, new, sole-source drugs. See 
infra Section I.C.  
73. See GAGNON & WOLFE, supra note 5, at 11 (“If Medicare Part D benefited from the same 
discounts as [VA], it would have saved $16 billion a year [in 2010].”); Gellad et al., supra note 66, 
at 1435 (Medicare would save about $22 billion a year in 2006 prices if it paid no more for its top 
200 drugs than DOD and VA pay); Woo & Baker, supra note 62, at 1 (“[T]he federal government 
could save from $230 billion to $541 billion over the next ten years if Congress and the President 
were to enable Medicare to negotiate prescription drug prices.”). 
13 - Kirkwood.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2016  12:15 PM 
270 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:253 
 
political environment, threaten to deny coverage altogether.
74
 As a 
result, the discount on such a drug is likely to be modest at best and its 
price is likely to be very high. 
2. Choice of Drugs 
If the federal government negotiated prescription drug prices for 
Medicare and used its formulary aggressively, threatening to exclude 
any drug with a substitute if its price were too great, the result could be a 
very narrow formulary.
75
 In each therapeutic category there might be 
only one option. Such a severe restriction on consumer choice is 
unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, suppose that several drugs are 
substitutes for most patients and the government has excluded all but 
one of them from its formulary. If some patients nevertheless need an 
excluded drug—if, for them, the drug on the formulary does not provide 
an adequate treatment—they could be given the right to appeal the 
exclusion, as Part D now provides.
76
 In short, for patients that require a 
drug, their choice need not be restricted. Second, the government does 
not have to exclude many drugs from its formulary in order to obtain 
substantial discounts. The mere threat of exclusion may be enough to 
convince a manufacturer to reduce its price. In other words, if there are 
three substitutes in a therapeutic category, and the government is willing 
to exclude any two of them if their prices are not cut, all three may offer 
a significant discount in order to avoid exclusion. For this reason, 
European countries have been able to offer their citizens both low prices 
                                                     
74. This would not be the case if Congress allowed Medicare to ration care—to refuse to cover 
even a life-saving drug if, for example, the number of beneficiaries was tiny and the price of the 
drug was astronomical. But at the moment, this form of cost-effectiveness calculation is politically 
unacceptable. See Frank & Newhouse, supra note 26, at 39 (“In the Medicare context, there will 
surely be strong political pressure not to allow PDPs to leave unique (and presumably superior) 
products off the formulary.”); Robert Pear, White House Withdraws Plan Allowing Limits to 
Medicare Coverage for Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2014, at A13 (“Under pressure from 
patients, pharmaceutical companies and members of Congress from both parties, the Obama 
administration . . . withdrew a proposal that would have allowed insurers to limit Medicare coverage 
for certain classes of drugs; [while] the proposal would have saved money . . . it created political 
problems for the White House.”). 
75. At present, as noted earlier, PDPs must cover at least two drugs in every therapeutic category, 
and in six categories they must cover all or substantially all the drugs in the category. See supra note 
51 and accompanying text. To maximize the government’s ability to obtain discounts, these 
restrictions should be eliminated. As explained below, however, increasing the government’s ability 
to threaten to exclude a drug from its formulary does not mean it will actually be excluded.  
76. See MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 367 (“Plans are required to establish exceptions and appeals 
processes to ensure that their formularies do not impede access to needed medications.”). The 
existing processes appear to be “complex and burdensome for many individuals,” however, and 
MEDPAC has recommended “increased transparency and streamlining.” Id. at 367, 369. 
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and broad formularies.
77
 
In short, while federal negotiation may result in some narrowing of 
consumer choice, the overall impact is unlikely to be large. No patient 
would be denied a needed medicine and most patients are likely to have 
multiple options. The impact of federal negotiation on innovation would 
be similar: there would be some adverse effect but it is unlikely to be 
large. 
3. New Drug Development 
If the federal government takes over the procurement of prescription 
drugs for Medicare, it is likely that pharmaceutical R&D would decline. 
Because the government would obtain greater discounts on many drugs 
than PDPs now achieve, the average return on developing a new drug is 
likely to fall, and the companies are likely to engage in less of this 
activity. As many economists have noted, a rational pharmaceutical 
manufacturer would not invest in R&D unless the investment is expected 
to be profitable.
78
 If the average price of a new drug were to decline, 
then R&D projects at the margin—those that are just profitable at 
existing prices—would no longer be undertaken. While we do not know 
the exact size of this effect, we do know that Medicare Part D led to an 
increase in R&D.
79
 Since Part D increased the demand for prescription 
drugs, this suggests a direct link between profitability and R&D.
80
 
Despite this link, it does not appear that federal negotiation would 
have a large impact on pharmaceutical innovation. Multiple studies 
suggest that branded drug manufacturers have been exceptionally 
                                                     
77. See Bach, supra note 71. 
A recent survey of cancer drug policies revealed you don’t have to say no very often to get 
discounts for saying yes. Of the 29 major cancer drugs included in the study that are available 
in the United States, an estimated 97 percent and 86 percent are also available in Germany and 
France [at much lower prices] respectively. 
Id.  
78. See, e.g., Blair & Durrance, supra note 4, at 4 (“For an investment in a pharmaceutical R&D 
project to make economic sense, it must have a reasonable expectation of profits.”); Newhouse, 
supra note 46, at 92 (“R&D requires capital, and a manufacturer will not obtain or invest that capital 
unless it can, on a probabilistic basis, obtain a return at least equal to the capital’s next best use.”). 
79. See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, Market Size and Innovation: Effects of 
Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Research and Development, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 327, 334 (2013).  
80. Moreover, R&D increased the most in protected drug classes—the classes where PDPs have 
little power to negotiate discounts and where, as a result, the greatest increase in profitability 
occurred. See id.; William S. Comanor, The Economics of Research and Development in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 54, 71 (F. Sloan & C.R. Hsieh eds., 
2007) (noting that a 2005 study found that a ten percent increase in real drug prices was associated 
with nearly a six percent rise in R&D intensity).  
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profitable in recent years.
81
 If this is correct, then even if marginal R&D 
projects became unprofitable, most projects would remain worthwhile. 
Put differently, if the industry has consistently earned high profits, 
despite the high failure rate of new drugs,
82
 then its overall, risk-adjusted 
return on investment has been above the competitive level. If so, the 
profitability of many drugs could be reduced significantly without 
depriving the industry of a competitive return on most R&D. 
In addition, profits are unlikely to fall significantly on drugs that have 
no substitutes. On these drugs—the drugs that matter most to patients—
the government’s leverage to obtain discounts would be severely limited. 
In consequence, the companies’ motivation to develop them would 
remain largely, if not completely, unchanged. This motivation is likely 
                                                     
81. GAGNON & WOLFE, supra note 5, at 13 (“An accounting study based on the annual reports of 
10 of the largest global pharmaceutical firms over the 10-year period from 1996 to 2005 
revealed . . . a net return on shareholders’ invested capital of 29%.”); Fuchs & Lee, supra note 32 
(“According to a January 2015 analysis by Aswath Damodaran, a professor at New York University 
Stern School of Business, the average yearly profit margin for the top 151 pharmaceutical 
companies world-wide is more than 24%.”); Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical 
Research and Development: What Do We Get for All That Money?, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 4348, 4349 
(2012) (“Net profits after taxes consistently remain substantially higher than profits for all other 
Fortune 500 companies.”); Whalen, supra note 5 (“Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in 
the S&P 1500 earn an average net profit margin of 16%, compared with an average of about 7% for 
all companies in the index, according to S&P Capital IQ.”); see also Emanuel, supra note 67. 
Regardless of the risks, many drug companies are making huge profits. Gilead, maker of 
Sovaldi, has profits of around 50 percent. Biogen, Amgen and other biotech firms have profits 
of around 30 percent. Merck and Pfizer are seeing profits of 18 percent or more. Even if profits 
were cut by a third or a half, there would be sufficient incentive to assume the risks of drug 
development. 
Id.; Kantarjian et al., supra note 12, at 210 (noting that “pharmaceutical companies were healthy 
and profitable a decade ago when cancer drug prices were on average less than $30,000 per year”); 
id. at 208 (stating that in 2012, virtually every new cancer drug was priced above $100,000 per 
year).  
In contrast, an earlier study concluded that drug companies earned an average return on R&D of 
just 11.5%, only modestly above their cost of capital. See H. Grabowski et al., Returns on Research 
and Development for 1990s New Drug Innovations, 30 PHARMACOECONOMICS 11, 27 (2002). The 
authors assert that their work supports a “virtuous rent seeking model,” in which increases in 
industry profitability lead to increases in R&D, which produce more new drugs and drive industry 
returns back to the competitive level. Id. at 28. The studies and sources cited above, however, 
suggest that this model is no longer working as fully as before, leaving industry profits at a high 
level for a significant period of time. To be sure, the model could reassert itself or the studies and 
sources could be wrong. To address this uncertainty, it would be important, as recommended below, 
to monitor the federal negotiation process and adjust payments to drug companies if significant 
problems with innovation develop. See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
82. See Comanor & Scherer, supra note 37, at 108 (noting that “of drugs that survive all three 
[FDA] testing phases, only about one-third achieve sufficient commercial sales and profits to pay 
back the capitalized value of their R&D investments”); Robert A. Ingram, A Not-So-Transparent 
Attempt to Cap Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2015, at A15 (“The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approves only 12% of potential medicines that enter clinical trials.”). 
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to be substantial, given the way these drugs are priced. Studies of new 
cancer drugs have found that drug makers base their prices not on the 
cost of developing them but on the price of the most similar existing 
treatment. Indeed, the new price is usually set above the price of the 
existing treatment, producing a steady escalation of new drug prices.
83
 
Because of the companies’ pricing discretion, the incentive to generate 
“breakthrough” drugs would remain substantial, even if drug companies 
were forced to give rebates on all drugs.
84
 In fact, because federal 
negotiation would increase the relative profitability of new, unique 
drugs, it may actually heighten the incentive to develop them.
85
 Finally, 
the companies are aided in their search for the next breakthrough drug 
by the federal government’s extensive support of basic scientific 
research.
86
 
In short, it appears that federal negotiation of Medicare prescription 
drug prices is unlikely to cause a large decline in new drug development, 
particularly of drugs that constitute a major therapeutic advance. At the 
same time, the prices of those important new drugs are likely to remain 
high and, so long as they are on patent, to increase significantly each 
year. Since the government has little power to reduce these prices 
through negotiation alone, it may be appropriate, if fiscal pressures 
                                                     
83. See Howard et al., supra note 12, at 154–55 (noting that oncologists, industry insiders, and 
others indicate that drug companies commonly use a reference price model—rather than costs—to 
set the prices of anticancer drugs; i.e., they price a new drug close to and often somewhat above the 
price of the most recent similar drug on the market, causing price levels to escalate over time); 
Andrew Pollack, Drug Companies Increasingly Pushed to Explain High Prices, N.Y. TIMES, July 
23, 2015, at B1 (“In many cases, it appears, the price of new drugs is set in comparison to rival 
drugs already on the market, and usually a bit higher.”). In fact, drug companies have long used this 
model to set the launch prices of patented drugs that offer a therapeutic advance over existing 
medicines. See Lu & Comanor, supra note 37.  
84. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 55 
(2011) (requiring drug companies to offer a minimum rebate “would not significantly reduce the 
incentive to develop ‘breakthrough’ drugs because those drugs could be launched at prices that were 
high enough to largely offset the rebate”); Brill, supra note 1 (“All the numbers tell one consistent 
story: Regulating drug prices the way other countries do would save tens of billions of dollars while 
still offering profit margins that would keep encouraging the pharmaceutical companies’ quest for 
the next great drug.”). 
85. See Duggan & Morton, supra note 41, at 606 (suggesting that if “Part D reduces prices for 
drugs that have close substitutes rather than for drugs that do not have substitutes,” then it 
“increases the incentives for firms to invent novel treatments”). 
86. See Kantarjian et al., supra note 12, at 209 (noting that “85% of cancer basic research is 
funded through taxpayers’ money; drug companies spend only 1.3% of their revenues on basic 
research”). Of course, the development, testing, and commercialization of a new drug requires much 
more than basic research. As a result, the bulk of new drug R&D is financed by the drug companies, 
not the federal government. For a calculation of the amounts involved, see Grabowski et al., supra 
note 81.  
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become acute, to turn to compulsory arbitration. 
C. Compulsory Arbitration 
Professors Frank and Newhouse have proposed a system in which the 
manufacturer, the government, and an independent expert would each 
name a price and the arbitrator would have to pick one.
87
 The expert’s 
price would aim to provide the manufacturer with a competitive return 
on its R&D, adjusted for risk and for the value of the drug.
88
 Such a 
system could bring the prices of these major drugs closer to the optimal 
level, high enough to induce considerable future innovation but low 
enough to prevent excessive profit taking. 
Compulsory arbitration deserves serious consideration, especially if 
the prices of new and unique drugs continue to soar. One virtue of the 
arbitration method just described is that it would produce three pricing 
proposals: one by the manufacturer, one by the government, and one by 
an independent expert. That diversity is likely to increase the chance that 
the arbitrator chooses the best price. For this reason, arbitration may well 
be superior to either direct regulation of new drug prices (in which the 
government alone sets the price) or the status quo (in which the 
manufacturer alone sets the price). On the other hand, it would be risky 
to adopt both federal negotiation and compulsory arbitration at the same 
time. That would reduce the prices of drugs with substitutes and the 
prices of unique drugs, which could cause pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to cut R&D precipitously. It may be more prudent as a first step to allow 
federal negotiation of Medicare drug prices without compulsory 
arbitration. If necessary, compulsory arbitration could be added later. 
D.  Overall Assessment 
But whether or not arbitration is part of the package, federal 
negotiation of Medicare prescription drug prices ought to be pursued. As 
Section I.B showed, it is likely to produce substantial reductions in the 
prices of many drugs without creating large risks to innovation or 
consumer choice. Moreover, if problems do arise, they can be corrected. 
Medicare already sets the prices it pays hospitals, physicians, and long-
term care facilities. To ensure that those payments are adequate to 
                                                     
87. See Frank & Newhouse, supra note 26, at 40–41.  
88. See id. at 41 (stating that an expert’s price would be “based on the expected break-even price 
for a drug, given the size of the market and the R&D costs in a therapeutic area, the incremental 
health benefit per unit of cost of the new drug, and the risk-adjusted rate of return”). 
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generate the supply and quality desired, MEDPAC monitors them on a 
regular basis and recommends changes to Congress.
89
 The same process 
should be applied to prescription drugs, providing a regular opportunity 
for adjustment.
90
 
Federal negotiation also enjoys widespread support. Polls show that 
most Americans, Republicans as well as Democrats, endorse it,
91
 and an 
increasing number of doctors are adding their voices.
92
 While new 
legislation may be improbable at the moment, congressional interest is 
likely to grow if rising federal healthcare expenditures threaten the 
nation’s ability to fund fundamental national priorities. 
In contrast, allowing large insurance companies to merge is unlikely 
to be a desirable way to lower healthcare costs. While large mergers are 
likely to increase buyer power—and sometimes reduce both excessive 
provider prices and premiums—most combinations of large insurance 
companies are likely to present significant competitive risks. 
II. MERGERS OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The U.S. healthcare system is a hybrid system, part public and part 
private. In the public programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
                                                     
89. See generally MEDPAC, supra note 1. MEDPAC examines four issues: beneficiaries’ access 
to care, quality of care, providers’ access to capital, and current Medicare payments and providers’ 
costs. If its analysis indicates that payments should be increased, it recommends payment updates to 
Congress. See id. at iii (stating that its report “fulfills the Commission’s legislative mandate to 
evaluate Medicare payment issues and to make recommendations to the Congress”); id. at 41 
(identifying the issues it considers).  
90. Under this process, payments to providers would not be increased unless Congress passed 
legislation to increase them. See id. at iv (indicating that it is Congress’ responsibility to “grapple 
with the difficult task of controlling the growth of Medicare spending while preserving 
beneficiaries’ access to high-quality care and providing sufficient payment for efficient providers”). 
Therefore, if Congress did not act, a recommended increase in drug prices would not occur. But the 
risk of that seems small, since a price increase would have the support of the powerful drug lobby. 
See Whalen, supra note 5 (referring to “the drug industry’s political clout”). 
91. See NAT’L COMM. TO PRES. SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE, ISSUE BRIEF – MEDICARE DRUG 
NEGOTIATION AND REBATES 2 (2014) (“National polls indicate that the majority of Americans, 
across party lines, support allowing Medicare to negotiate with drug companies to bring down the 
cost of prescription drugs.”). 
92. See Pollack, supra note 83 (“[M]ore than 100 prominent oncologists called for support of a 
grass-roots movement to stem the rapid increases of prices of cancer drugs, including by letting 
Medicare negotiate prices with pharmaceutical companies . . . .”). In addition, both the leading 
Democratic presidential candidates and the New York Times support federal negotiation. See Margot 
Sanger-Katz, Prescription Costs Arise as a Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, at A3 
(noting mounting public concern with prescription drug prices and proposals by Hillary Rodham 
Clinton and Bernie Sanders to address that concern); Editorial, Use Medicare’s Muscle to Lower 
Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2015, at A18; see also supra note 31 (providing sources 
indicating that President Obama concurs).  
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VA, the federal government is generally the purchaser of healthcare 
goods and services.
93
 In the private segments, however, the principal 
source of buyer power is more fragmented: the numerous insurance 
companies, large and small, that cover individuals, small groups, and 
large employers. On behalf of their subscribers, these companies 
negotiate reimbursement rates with hospitals, physicians, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, and other providers. Part II asks whether health insurers 
ought to be allowed to merge to exert greater buyer power against 
hospitals and physicians. 
The answer depends on the resolution of three issues: 
(1) Is the merged firm likely to obtain lower prices from 
hospitals and physicians? 
(2) Are these lower prices likely to be procompetitive rather 
than anticompetitive (i.e., are they likely to reduce market 
power upstream rather than exploit small, competitive 
providers)? 
(3) Are these lower prices likely to be passed on to consumers 
(i.e., would the merger preserve competition downstream or 
would it instead create market power and raise insurance 
premiums)?
94
 
The following Sections address each issue, determining what it would 
take for a health insurance merger to be procompetitive on balance. The 
answer is not encouraging. A merger that is large enough to pass the first 
test (because it would lower provider prices significantly) may also fail 
the second and/or third tests (because it would exploit small providers 
and/or impose higher premiums on consumers). In consequence, it does 
not seem prudent, as a general rule, to promote mergers of large health 
insurance companies. Although some may be procompetitive—reducing 
both excessive provider prices and insurance premiums—most are likely 
to generate significant risks to competition. 
A. Lower Prices from Providers 
There is little doubt that a merger of substantial insurance companies 
would result in lower provider prices. Both economic theory and 
                                                     
93. The major exception is the procurement of prescription drugs for Medicare. As just discussed, 
that exception ought to be eliminated.  
94. These three issues determine whether a health insurance merger is likely to enhance buyer 
power and whether that power is likely to benefit consumers, exploit powerless suppliers, or both. 
They are not the only issues that need to be addressed in evaluating the overall competitive impact 
of an insurance merger. It would also be necessary to consider, for example, whether the transaction 
would reduce operating costs or otherwise improve efficiency. 
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multiple studies indicate that insurance companies with greater 
bargaining power tend to obtain greater pricing concessions from 
providers. Thus, if the government were to allow two large insurance 
companies to merge, the reimbursement rates that hospitals and 
physicians receive would almost certainly fall. 
The theoretical basis for this prediction is straightforward. It is the 
same theory that explains why private health plans are able to negotiate 
discounts from drug makers and why the federal government, if it were 
the sole buyer of prescription drugs for Medicare, would obtain even 
larger discounts. By merging, two health insurers would increase the 
volume of business they could move from one provider to another, 
enhancing their ability to reward providers that offer lower prices and 
penalize those that do not. Put another way, the value to a provider of 
being included in the insurer’s network—or the loss from being 
excluded—would be greater.95 As a result, the merged company could 
pit providers against each other more effectively.
96
 In addition, it would 
be more difficult for a provider to resist the demands of the merged 
company when its market share has increased and the number of other 
insurers has fallen.
97
 
These theoretical observations have been repeatedly confirmed by 
empirical studies. After noting that “most previous studies find a 
negative relationship between insurer market share and prices,”98 
Moriya, Vogt, and Gaynor report the same conclusion: “[w]e find that 
increased insurance market concentration is significantly associated with 
lower hospital prices.”99 Their results indicate that in a market with five 
                                                     
95. This is the reason health insurers use narrow networks to obtain larger discounts. See Reed 
Abelson, Health Care Trade-Off: Fewer Choices, Lower Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2015, at B2 
(“Insurers say one way to lower the price of a plan is to limit the number of hospitals and doctors in 
their networks. They can then ask providers to discount their prices in return for a potentially higher 
volume of patients . . . .”). 
96. Many economists have recognized that health plans extract discounts from providers by 
playing them off against each other. See, e.g., Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, Competition in 
Health Care Markets, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 499, 504 (2012) (“The rise of 
HMOs during the 1990s is widely credited with significantly reducing health care cost growth, 
primarily through tough price negotiations.”); Katherine Ho, Insurer-Provider Networks in the 
Medical Care Market, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 407 (2009) (quoting a hospital executive as saying 
“[t]here are examples where there were too many hospitals in an area and the plans played them off 
against each other to the point where the price paid was no more than marginal cost”). 
97. Cf. MEDPAC, supra note 1, at 7 (“[I]nsurance market concentration can decrease health care 
spending because providers may have less leverage in negotiating prices where insurers are 
dominant . . . .”). 
98. Asako S. Moriya et al., Hospital Prices and Market Structure in the Hospital and Insurance 
Industries, 5 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 459, 461 (2010).  
99. Id. at 476. 
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equally sized insurers, a merger of two of the companies would reduce 
hospital prices market wide by approximately 6.7%.
100
 The authors 
remark that these findings are insufficient to show that health plans 
exercise monopsony power.
101
 That is correct. Given the concentration 
of hospital markets discussed below, it is likely that most hospitals 
possess market power. For this reason, when insurance companies 
bargain with them, the insurers ordinarily exercise countervailing power, 
not monopsony power. 
Melnick, Shen, and Yu found similar results: “[h]igher health plan 
market concentration reduces hospital prices. . . . For example, a 1,000-
point increase in the health plan concentration index is, on average, 
associated with 2.5 percent lower hospital prices.”102 They also found 
that “health plan concentration reduces hospital prices at a much greater 
rate in those areas where health plan markets are the most concentrated 
but reduces them at a much smaller rate in less concentrated ones.”103 
Both conclusions suggest that mergers of substantial health insurers are 
likely to benefit consumers, provided the mergers do not create market 
power downstream and raise insurance premiums. The authors state: 
“our results show that more concentrated health plan markets can 
counteract the price-increasing effects of concentrated hospital markets, 
and that—contrary to conventional wisdom—increased health plan 
concentration benefits consumers through lower hospital prices as long 
as health plan markets remain competitive.”104 
The most recent study endorses the same position.
105
 Unlike the 
Moriya and Melnick studies, however, it also examines whether higher 
concentration among insurers tends to increase downstream market 
                                                     
100. Id. at 474–75. A somewhat larger increase in HHI (1000 points) “would reduce per-case 
prices by 8.4%.” Id. at 471. In a later review of the literature, Gaynor and Town caution that these 
“results are very sensitive to the inclusion of one or two states.” Gaynor & Town, supra note 96, at 
625. 
101. Moriya et al., supra note 98, at 476.  
102. Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Increased Concentration of Health Plan Markets Can Benefit 
Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1728, 1730 (2011). 
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 1728. 
105. See Erin E. Trish & Bradley J. Herring, How Do Health Insurer Market Concentration and 
Bargaining Power with Hospitals Affect Health Insurance Premiums?, 42 J. HEALTH ECON. 104, 
113 (2015). 
[O]ur findings . . . suggest that higher levels of insurer bargaining leverage with hospitals may 
lead to lower health insurance premiums via lower negotiated hospital prices, as long as there 
is sufficient competition in the market for selling insurance to small employers that these lower 
prices get passed through to employers in the form of lower premiums. 
Id.  
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power and finds that it does, potentially offsetting any benefits from 
greater buyer power.
106
 The study’s distinctive contribution, however, is 
that it uncovers evidence that the impact of buyer power exceeds the 
impact of higher downstream concentration and that a merger of 
insurance companies may therefore increase consumer welfare. Section 
II.C discusses this provocative finding in more detail. As that discussion 
explains, the net impact on consumers is small. Moreover, the study does 
not address another potentially fatal objection to a merger of insurers—
that it would enable the merged firm to exercise monopsony power 
against small providers. 
Section II.B examines that issue, looking at how often a merged 
insurer is likely to exercise monopsony power, rather than countervailing 
power. Section II.B also addresses the likely consequences of 
monopsony power for consumers as well as small providers. 
B. Effects of Lower Provider Prices 
1. Countervailing Power 
As the prior discussion suggests, a merger of insurance companies is 
more likely to be procompetitive where the merged company would 
exercise countervailing power against providers, forcing hospitals and 
physician groups with market power to lower their prices closer to the 
competitive level. Those lower prices would enable the merged firm to 
reduce premiums and co-pays, enhancing competition in the insurance 
market and benefiting consumers. In contrast, a merger would have 
anticompetitive effects if the merged firm would exercise monopsony 
power against small providers, forcing them to accept prices below the 
competitive level. In that situation, as explained below, the reduction in 
provider prices is unlikely to enhance competition downstream or 
benefit consumers, but it would exploit vulnerable providers. In short, 
the desirability of lower provider prices hinges in large part on whether 
they reflect the exercise of countervailing power against providers with 
market power or monopsony power against small, powerless providers. 
As the next two Sections describe, the evidence indicates that most 
hospitals and some physician groups possess market power. Other 
physician groups, however, are likely to be vulnerable to the exercise of 
monopsony power. 
                                                     
106. See id. at 109 (finding a statistically significant, positive relationship between insurer 
concentration and premiums paid by small employers, holding all other factors constant, including 
the impact of insurer concentration on hospital prices).  
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a. Hospitals 
Hospitals, the largest providers in the American healthcare system, 
frequently exercise market power. That power flows from several 
sources. First, most hospital markets are concentrated. A recent study by 
Cutler and Morton found that “concentration is pervasive. Nearly half 
(n=150) of hospital markets in the United States are highly concentrated, 
another third (n=98) are moderately concentrated, and the remaining 
one-sixth (n=58) are unconcentrated. No hospital markets are considered 
highly competitive.”107 Other studies have reached the same 
conclusion.
108
 In addition, mergers contribute to these high levels of 
concentration and many retrospective studies have found that hospital 
mergers led to higher prices. For example, a “recent summary cites 8 
studies that show price increases in the range of 10% to 40% due to 
mergers.”109 
Market power can also result from the distinctive prestige that certain 
hospitals possess. As Cutler and Morton note: 
flagship academic medical centers offering perceived higher 
quality care often wield enormous market 
power. . . . [C]onsumers highly value the option of obtaining 
care at these hospitals, and . . . a patient who has a serious illness 
and also is well insured will seek out these hospitals with little 
regard for price.
110
 
                                                     
107. David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 
JAMA 1964, 1966 (2013). The authors used the concentration thresholds in the federal 
government’s merger guidelines. See id. at 1965, 1970. 
108. See Cotter, supra note 38, at 5 (“According to Capps and Dranove, the average metropolitan 
statistical area HHI in the market for hospital ownership as of 2009 was ‘roughly 4700,’ well above 
the level (2500) the enforcement agencies consider highly concentrated.” (citing CORY CAPPS & 
DAVID DRANOVE, BATES WHITE, MARKET CONCENTRATION OF HOSPITALS 2 (2011), 
http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-
Consolidation-Final.pdf [https:// perma.cc/J4X5-JB2S]); Gaynor & Town, supra note 96, at 503 
(“[H]ospital markets are highly concentrated on average . . . .”); id. (“In 2006, of the 332 MSAs in 
the US, 250 had HHIs greater than 2,500.”). 
109. Cutler & Morton, supra note 107, at 1967–68 (citing Health Care Industry Consolidation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Martin Gaynor, Professor, H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy & Management, 
Carnegie Mellon University)); see also Gaynor & Town, supra note 96, at 551–52 (concluding, 
after reviewing the literature, that “on average, hospital mergers result in increases in price”); 
Moriya et al., supra note 98, at 461 (“There are a large number of studies assessing hospital market 
power. . . . The vast majority of these studies find that concentration increases hospital prices.”). 
110. Cutler & Morton, supra note 107, at 1967; see also Ho, supra note 96, at 407–08 (quoting a 
hospital director stating that “the prices [the best hospitals] charge are based on their very high 
patient satisfaction results and their strong reputation. They can get high prices from any plan in the 
market”). 
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A large metropolitan hospital may also command a price premium 
because it specializes in advanced procedures and has performed them in 
sufficient volume that no other hospital in the area can match its 
quality.
111
 Finally, market power can arise from membership in a 
healthcare system. Even if no hospitals in the system are direct 
competitors, the system may possess considerable market power because 
it contains so many hospitals in a region that health plans cannot be 
widely marketed in that region without including the system in their 
networks.
112
 
Most hospitals, in short, have market power, whether they operate in 
concentrated markets, enjoy distinctive prestige, or belong to a large 
system. Confronting a hospital with market power, a health plan can 
negotiate larger discounts if it acquires a competing plan and increases 
the countervailing power it can exercise against that hospital.
113
 
b. Physicians 
Physicians typically negotiate with health insurance companies by 
collaborating in some way. They may form a group practice such as a 
large, multi-specialty clinic or a smaller unit made up entirely of doctors 
practicing a single specialty. They may join a major healthcare system 
made up of multiple hospitals, physicians, nurses, and other 
professionals. Or they may band together into an independent practice 
association (IPA) that negotiates contracts with particular health plans 
and shares the risks of those contracts, but otherwise preserves the 
independence of its members.
114
 Whatever form the doctors choose, 
                                                     
111. See Cutler & Morton, supra note 107, at 1966 (“The learning curve for individual physicians 
and surgical teams means that the large hospital in a city or region will frequently offer better care 
options to patients.”). 
112. See EMANUEL, supra note 2, at 75. 
Within the last few years larger hospitals have been buying up neighboring hospitals to form 
large hospital systems. A primary rationale is to increase the hospitals’ bargaining power with 
the commercial insurers in order to be able to raise their rates. If many of the hospitals in a 
geographic region are part of a single hospital system, then the insurer must include them in a 
network and the hospital system can demand higher rates. 
Id. 
113. While countervailing power is generally procompetitive, it can also be exercised in 
anticompetitive ways. In an earlier article, I identified and discussed ten anticompetitive scenarios. 
See Kirkwood, supra note 19, at 1536–58. Although they are outside the scope of this Article, any 
comprehensive analysis of a large insurance merger would have to consider those possibilities as 
well. 
114. See Abe Dunn & Adam Hale Shapiro, Do Physicians Possess Market Power?, 57 J.L. & 
ECON. 159, 163 n.8 (2014). In the Seattle area, for example, as their websites indicate, the 
Polyclinic is a multi-specialty clinic, Northwest Asthma & Allergy is a more narrowly specialized 
clinic, UW Medicine is a major healthcare system (with four hospitals, more than 1800 physicians 
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these collaborations, if large or distinctive enough, may create market 
power. 
There is little systematic evidence on the extent of physician market 
power,
115
 but there is good reason to believe it exists. In 2013, a national 
commission on physician payment reform observed that “physicians are 
banding together in larger groups to increase their own bargaining power 
and gain higher reimbursement.”116 In 2014, an econometric study found 
statistically significant evidence that doctors in more concentrated 
markets charge higher prices than doctors in more competitive 
markets.
117
 The difference was substantial: “a physician in a market with 
the 90th-percentile concentration will charge fees that are approximately 
14-30 percent higher than a physician in the 10th-percentile market.”118 
The authors also found that consolidation of physicians “has a much 
stronger effect on prices when the market is initially more 
concentrated.”119 In an unconcentrated market, a merger of two 
physicians groups would have an imperceptible impact on prices. But in 
a market with three equal-sized groups, a merger of two of them would 
increase prices ten percent to fourteen percent.
120
 Thus, the authors 
conclude: “physicians in concentrated markets are able to exercise 
market power.”121 
The study also found evidence that physicians, like hospitals, charge 
lower prices when insurance markets are more concentrated.
122
 But the 
desirability of these lower prices is less clear. Had all the physicians 
been exercising market power, the reductions would have been 
                                                     
and other professionals, and twelve neighborhood clinics), and Northwest Physicians Network is an 
independent practice association.  
115. See id. at 160 (“[T]here has been very little research regarding physicians’ bargaining 
power.”); Gaynor & Town, supra note 96, at 611 (“[T]he empirical literature on physician 
competition is quite sparse.”). 
116. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM 8 (2013). 
117. See Dunn & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 162 (“We find that physician concentration is 
positively and significantly correlated with service price levels.”). 
118. Id. In one of the specialties studied, cardiology, the ninetieth concentration percentile was 
4080 while the tenth percentile was 110. See id. at 174 (referring to the HHI figures as .408 and 
.011). The authors did not provide comparable figures for the other specialty, orthopedics. They also 
used a complicated method to estimate physician concentration, since they did not have revenue 
data for individual physician groups.  
119. Id. at 182. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 186. Just as with hospitals, when there are fewer physician groups in a market, health 
insurers find it more difficult to induce discounts by threatening to move business elsewhere. There 
are fewer options available.  
122. Id.  
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beneficial. As Professor Gaynor has observed: “[i]nsurers can engage in 
hard bargaining with physicians that can make subscribers better off 
through reduced premiums.”123 But if some of the doctors had been 
pricing competitively, and the insurers obtained lower prices by 
exercising monopsony power against them, the reduced prices would be 
less desirable, as the following Section explains. It first looks at whether 
health insurers are likely to exert monopsony power over hospitals and 
then turns to physicians. 
2. Monopsony Power 
a. Hospitals 
The literature contains few, if any, examples of a monopsonistic 
health insurer exploiting a powerless hospital. There is one recent 
allegation: in West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC,
124
 the 
plaintiff claimed that Highmark, the dominant health insurer in the 
Pittsburgh area with a market share of sixty percent to eighty percent,
125
 
exercised monopsony power against the plaintiff, a relatively small 
hospital with a market share of twenty-three percent.
126
 As a result, the 
plaintiff alleged that Highmark forced it to accept reimbursement rates 
that were below the competitive level.
127
 While the Third Circuit refused 
to dismiss these charges, it did not discuss whether there was evidence to 
support them. This is symptomatic. There is little evidence that health 
plans exercise monopsony power over hospitals, even small hospitals 
with low market shares. Although there is, as noted above, extensive 
evidence that insurers in more concentrated insurance markets obtain 
lower prices from hospitals, these lower prices are more likely to 
represent the exercise of countervailing power, since hospital markets 
are typically concentrated and most hospitals in them appear to have 
market power.
128
 
It is possible, of course, that a dominant insurance company might 
exercise monopsony power against a small hospital in a concentrated 
                                                     
123. Martin Gaynor, Why Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like Tanks for Liquefied Gases? Some 
Reflections on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 497, 506 (2006). 
124. 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
125. Id. at 92. According to the complaint, the only other significant insurer was UPMC Health 
Plan and it was basically unwilling to deal with the plaintiff. See id. at 104 n.12. 
126. Id. at 91; see also id. at 103 (“[T]he complaint suggests that Highmark has substantial 
monopsony power.”).  
127. See id. at 103. 
128. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
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market that was not charging supracompetitive prices. If so, a merger 
that would create such a dominant insurance company might well 
warrant an antitrust challenge, even if the merger would also enable the 
company to exercise procompetitive countervailing power against 
hospitals with market power. The next Section discusses that issue—
whether a merger that would produce both monopsony power and 
procompetitive countervailing power should be illegal—in the context 
where it is more likely to arise: physician markets. 
b. Physicians 
If doctors negotiated their reimbursement rates with large insurance 
companies on an individual basis, there would be considerable reason to 
fear the exercise of monopsony power. Most individual doctors do not 
possess significant market power. But, as mentioned earlier, physicians 
ordinarily collaborate—in group practices, health systems, or IPAs—
when they negotiate with insurers, and in concentrated physician 
markets, there is evidence that these associations exercise market 
power.
129
 In unconcentrated markets, though, these groups are unlikely 
to have market power and, even in concentrated markets, some of them 
are likely to be essentially powerless. In consequence, a merger of 
insurance companies may well create monopsony power over at least 
some physician practices. The clearest case would involve a merger that 
creates a dominant health plan in a local market where the physicians are 
organized into numerous small groups, none of which has market power. 
In that situation, there is reason to expect multiple adverse effects. 
First, the exertion of monopsony power would harm the physicians, 
reducing their fees below the competitive level and transferring some of 
their wealth to the merged insurance company. Such a coerced transfer 
of wealth is a type of theft and is one of the prime reasons why Congress 
passed the antitrust laws. While Congress’s principal goal was to protect 
consumers, Congress also wanted to protect atomistic suppliers such as 
farmers and small businesses from monopsony power gained through 
anticompetitive means.
130
 In short, Congress intended to stop unjustified 
                                                     
129. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
130. See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers 
from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2434–35, 2442 (2013); John B. 
Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not 
Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 207–09, 233–36 (2008); Gregory J. Werden, 
Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 714 
(2007).  
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transfers of wealth on both the buy side and the sell side.
131
 
In addition, reducing doctors’ reimbursement is likely to harm 
consumers. Paid less for the work they do, the doctors in the relevant 
market may work fewer hours or devote less time to each patient,
132
 and 
fewer doctors are likely to enter the market. To be sure, the impact may 
not be large. There are numerous reasons—personal, professional, and 
legal—why a doctor would want to give each patient all the care he or 
she needs.
133
 But as experience with Medicaid has indicated, 
significantly lower reimbursement rates do cause some doctors to refuse 
to take new patients and to spend less time with existing patients.
134
 Of 
course, not every reduction in the quantity of healthcare services 
provided is undesirable. Services may be excessive because providers 
have market power and their supracompetitive margins entice them to 
provide additional services.
135
 Similarly, services may be excessive 
because of the perverse incentives of the fee-for-service payment 
system.
136
 But both effects are less likely in a competitive market and 
should become less likely in the future as payers move away from 
payments based on services to payments based on outcomes.
137
 In short, 
                                                     
131. For a particularly telling example of this dual objective, see 21 CONG. REC. 4098 (1890) 
(statement of Rep. Taylor) (“This monster [the beef trust] robs the farmer on the one hand and the 
consumer on the other.”). For other statements by members of Congress that equate unjustified 
wealth transfers with robbery or extortion, see Kirkwood, supra note 130, at 2434–35. 
132. See Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures: 
An Economic Analysis, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989, 1014–15 (2004). 
Some physicians may try to make up the lower reimbursement on volume, i.e., by seeing more 
patients per hour. This, of course, means spending less time with each patient. Even if the 
physician can still diagnose ailments correctly, the hurried environment may leave patients less 
satisfied. Worse, of course, is the distinct possibility that something important will be missed. 
Id.; Gaynor, supra note 123, at 506 (“If insurers possess monopsony power . . . they may push 
reimbursements so low that physicians supply less than the socially optimal quantity or quality of 
services.”). In addition, as David Frankford has pointed out to me, physicians may compensate for 
lower reimbursement rates by substituting more intensive services for less intensive ones. That 
could harm consumers if the more intensive services result in greater total costs or produce more 
frequent side effects. 
133. See Jill Boylston Herndon, Health Insurer Monopsony Power: The All-or-None Model, 21 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 197, 202–03 (2002). 
134. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key Groups of 
Americans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1721 (2010) (“[I]n today’s Medicaid program . . . rates to 
providers are typically well below both commercial and Medicare rates. As a result, many 
physicians do not accept Medicaid patients, and . . . Medicaid enrollees often are treated less 
intensively for a given condition.”). 
135. For example, if margins are high on certain tests, a physician may be tempted to order the 
tests more frequently.  
136. See Blair & Herndon, supra note 132, at 998 n.31 (referring to the “overutilization of 
services that typifies fee-for-service medicine”). 
137. See, e.g., Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS Efforts to Improve 
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if a merger confers monopsony power, it is likely to depress the supply 
of desirable services. 
This adverse consequence is unlikely to be outweighed by lower 
prices to consumers. In the textbook monopsony model, consumers do 
not benefit from the lower input prices obtained by a monopsonist. 
Instead, the monopsonist achieves those prices by reducing the volume 
of purchases below the competitive level. That tends to reduce the 
quantity of output the monopsonist offers for sale, which tends to raise 
prices to consumers, not lower them.
138
 In the monopsony model, in 
short, there is no pass through of lower input prices to consumers.
139
 In 
healthcare markets, however, the prices that consumers with insurance 
pay are determined by negotiations between the consumer’s insurer and 
providers, not by the quantity of output that either providers or insurance 
companies offer to sell. As a result, if a monopsonist insurer forces small 
physician groups to accept lower reimbursement rates, those rates could 
be passed on to the insurer’s subscribers in lower co-pays and lower 
premiums. This benefit to consumers is limited, however, by the 
intensity of downstream competition among insurance companies. 
Where downstream competition is intense, a monopsonist might well 
pass on lower provider prices in order to gain market share. But where 
the merger that created monopsony power would also create downstream 
market power—a likely combination, as the next section explains—the 
merged firm’s profit maximizing strategy may well be to raise 
premiums, not lower them. In West Penn, for example, the plaintiff 
alleged that Highmark, the dominant health insurer in the Pittsburgh 
area, did not pass on the lower reimbursement rates it extracted from the 
plaintiff but instead “repeatedly ratchet[ed] up insurance premiums.”140 
                                                     
U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015). 
A majority of Medicare fee-for-service payments already have a link to quality or value. Our 
goal is to have 85% of all Medicare fee-for-service payments tied to quality or value by 2016, 
and 90% by 2018. Perhaps even more important, our target is to have 30% of Medicare 
payments tied to quality or value through alternative payment models by the end of 2016, and 
50% of payments by the end of 2018. 
Id. 
138. Suppose, for example, that a firm acquires monopsony power over timber owners by 
acquiring all the sawmills in an area. The firm would exercise that power by reducing its purchases 
of timber. That, in turn, would reduce the amount of cut lumber the monopsonist would offer for 
sale, which would tend to raise the price of lumber for customers. 
139. See Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 606 
(2005); Kirkwood, supra note 19, at 1498; Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy 
and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 339 (1991). 
140. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010). Likewise, 
the Department of Justice recently challenged a merger of two Michigan health insurers, alleging it 
would create a firm with approximately ninety percent of the Lansing market. As a result, it would 
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In sum, if the physician market is unconcentrated, as it appears to be 
in many urban areas,
141
 a merger that created an insurance company with 
monopsony power would not only harm the physicians, it would 
probably harm consumers as well, both by reducing the supply of 
physician services and by raising insurance premiums. 
But suppose the physician market was composed of several large 
groups with market power and a few small groups with little or no 
power. Then a merger of insurance companies could raise overall 
consumer welfare, since the positive effects of the merged firm’s 
countervailing power might outweigh the negative effects of its 
monopsony power. But even if that were true, the merger should 
probably be blocked. As emphasized earlier, one of the fundamental 
goals of the antitrust laws is to protect small, powerless suppliers from 
the exercise of monopsony power.
142
 While Congress cared at least as 
much about consumers, there was little or no support for allowing 
mergers that created countervailing power, even though they would 
generally benefit consumers. Thus, if a merger was likely to produce 
both monopsony power and countervailing power, my judgment is that 
Congress, had it addressed the issue, would have assigned higher weight 
to protecting small suppliers from exploitation. The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines address an analogous situation—a merger of sellers that 
would allow the merged firm to exercise market power over a subset of 
its customers—and indicate that such a merger may be challenged, even 
if it benefits consumers overall.
143
 The Guidelines therefore reach a 
similar conclusion: where a merger would produce both anticompetitive 
harm to one group of suppliers or customers and procompetitive benefit 
to another group, the harm may be sufficient, by itself, to warrant an 
antitrust challenge.
144
 
                                                     
not only lower reimbursement rates for doctors but raise premiums for employers. See DAVID 
BALTO, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK: ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPETITION 10 (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/ 
aco_competition.html [https://perma.cc/2WNU-R22B]. 
141. See Dunn & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 174 n.31. 
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
143. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
§ 4.1.4 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WA7-T89M] 
(discussing a merger that would allow the merged firm to price discriminate against a targeted 
subset of its customers and stating that “the Agencies may identify relevant markets defined around 
those targeted customers”).  
144. To be sure, the government could exercise its prosecutorial discretion and allow the merger 
if the amount of monopsony power created was minimal relative to the amount of procompetitive 
countervailing power. But if the monopsony power was significant, the government need not engage 
in such balancing. 
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Of course, the ultimate impact of an insurance merger on consumers 
would depend not only on the type of buyer power it would create, but 
whether it would also create downstream market power. Section II.C 
addresses this critical issue. 
C. Downstream Market Power 
If a merger of health insurers is large enough to create significant 
buyer power, it may produce downstream market power as well, 
enabling the merged firm to raise premiums or reduce product quality.
145
 
If the insurance markets in a geographic area are concentrated on the 
buying side, they are likely to be concentrated on the selling side as well. 
After all, it is the same companies operating on both sides of the market. 
Thus, one major hurdle for two insurance companies attempting to 
merge would be to show that their combination would create 
countervailing power upstream but not an equivalent degree of market 
power downstream, producing a net gain for consumers. 
There are two principal ways of accomplishing this. One way is to 
show that insurance markets are relatively unconcentrated and that the 
merged firm would be able to exercise countervailing power but not 
market power. That is possible because, as numerous scholars have 
concluded, countervailing power can be exerted at relatively modest 
market shares—shares below what would normally be necessary to 
exercise single-firm market power.
146
 Thus, in a relatively 
                                                     
145. Indeed, a merger that creates downstream market power could result in both higher 
premiums and reduced product quality. If a purchaser (a “plan sponsor”) balks at paying the higher 
premiums, the insurance company may insist that it accept a less comprehensive health plan instead. 
See SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M. FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 252 (2d ed. 2012–15 Update) (“[I]f plan sponsors resist higher premiums, they then have to 
accept plans with higher out-of-pocket costs for plan members, more shallow coverage, narrower 
networks, or some combination of the above—all forms of less comprehensive insurance.”). 
146. See, e.g., Misha Petrovic & Gary G. Hamilton, Making Global Markets: Wal-Mart and Its 
Suppliers, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM 131 (Nelson 
Lichtenstein ed., 2006) (“Even for the biggest manufacturers of packaged consumer goods, from 
Procter and Gamble to Clorox and Revlon and from Del Monte to Nabisco and Sara Lee, the 
amount of business with Wal-Mart—typically ranging between 15 percent and 30 percent of total 
shipments—creates a significant dependency on the retailer’s demands.”); Paul W. Dobson & 
Roman Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power Come Together, 2008 WIS. 
L. REV. 331, 356 (“[A] buyer (or a group of buyers) could wield substantial buyer power . . . at 
levels of size and market share considerably below those that are needed to establish seller power in 
the final market.”); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition 
for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 449 (2008) (“[S]ignificantly lower wholesale prices can be 
achieved by retailers with relatively small market shares as long as the retailer has the ability to 
influence the share of its customers’ purchases . . . obtained by a chosen manufacturer.”); see also 
Kirkwood, supra note 19, at 1503–04 (citing additional support). 
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unconcentrated insurance market, a merger that resulted in an insurer 
with a twenty-five percent share may well enable the insurer to exercise 
countervailing power but not market power. If so, the merged firm is 
likely to be able to obtain lower prices from providers and, since the 
downstream market would remain competitive, it is likely to pass on 
those lower prices to consumers in the form of lower co-pays and 
premiums. Fuchs and Lee offer an example. They point out that in some 
local markets in California, “consumers will have a choice of seven 
different insurers.”147 At the same time, they contend that many hospitals 
and specialty physician practices exert market power.
148
 Where that is 
the case—where the downstream market is fragmented and upstream 
provider markets are concentrated—a merger of substantial health plans 
might create a firm that could exercise greater procompetitive 
countervailing power but neither monopsony power nor downstream 
market power. 
The second way to demonstrate consumer benefit would be to show 
that even though the merged firm would acquire both countervailing 
power and downstream market power, the effect of the former would 
outweigh the latter. This could happen if the merged firm obtains such 
substantial discounts from providers that its optimal strategy, despite the 
gain in market power, would be to lower premiums. In theory this is 
plausible, since even a merger to monopoly would result in a lower price 
if marginal costs fall enough. As Trish and Herring note, “a reduction in 
negotiated provider prices is essentially a downward shift in the insurer’s 
marginal cost curve.”149 
In their recent study, Trish and Herring found evidence of the second 
mechanism of consumer benefit but not the first. They did not find 
evidence that mergers of insurance companies were likely to create 
buyer power without creating seller power. Rather, they found that 
higher insurer concentration was associated with both greater buyer 
power and greater market power.
150
 They did, however, uncover 
evidence that the effect of buyer power is likely to outweigh—though 
not by much—the effect of greater seller power, leading to a small 
reduction in premiums. Their regressions implied that in a market of five 
equal-sized insurance companies,
151
 a merger of two of them would 
                                                     
147. Fuchs & Lee, supra note 32.  
148. See id. 
149. Trish & Herring, supra note 105, at 107.  
150. See id. at 105, 109.  
151. The HHI in such a market would be 2000. 
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lower premiums by twelve dollars—less than 0.3%.152 This reduction is 
tiny and does not constitute a strong argument for allowing mergers 
where the result would be both greater market power and greater buyer 
power. 
Moreover, unlike Trish and Herring, most researchers find that in 
more concentrated insurance markets, prices are higher, not lower. 
While they do not generally attempt to measure the impact of buyer 
power, their results suggest that, whatever its impact, it was not enough 
to offset the price-raising effect of greater downstream market power. 
Professor Dafny summarizes the current state of the literature: 
  There are a number of studies documenting lower insurance 
premiums in areas with more insurers, including on the state 
health insurance marketplaces, the large group market (self- and 
fully-insured combined), and Medicare Advantage. . . . 
  Arguably the most relevant research in light of the recent 
proposed mergers are two studies of consummated mergers. 
Both found that structural changes in market concentration led 
to higher insurance premiums.
153
 
In short, if a merger of large insurance companies were to increase 
concentration substantially in a downstream market, the bulk of the 
evidence indicates that premiums would go up, even though the merger 
is also likely to enable the merged firm to force providers with market 
power to charge lower prices. Dafny concluded: “[i]f past is prologue, 
insurance consolidation will tend to lead to lower payments to healthcare 
providers, but those lower payments will not be passed on to consumers. 
On the contrary, consumers can expect higher insurance premiums.”154 
                                                     
152. The authors used different measures of concentration to disentangle the effects of greater 
concentration on buyer power and market power. Specifically, they measured buy-side 
concentration across the entire array of an insurer’s business, including its fully insured products 
and its administrative services (such as claims processing and organizing provider networks), which 
are typically sold to large employers that self-insure. They measured sell-side concentration in the 
sale of fully insured products only. See Trish & Herring, supra note 105, at 105. The first measure 
indicated that a five-to-four merger would lower premiums by 1.9% ($90). The second measure 
indicated that such a merger would raise premiums by 1.7% ($78). The combined effect of both 
measures—the increase in buyer power and the increase in market power—would be a reduction in 
premiums of $12. See id. at 109. 
153. Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know from the Past, Is It Relevant in 
Light of the ACA, and What Should We Ask?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, 
Competition Pol’y, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 11 (2015) 
(statement of Leemore S. Dafny, Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern 
University) [hereinafter Health Insurance Industry Consolidation]; see also Gaynor & Town, supra 
note 96, at 609 (“Most of the studies find evidence that competition leads to lower prices.”). 
154. Health Insurance Industry Consolidation, supra note 153, at 9. 
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To be sure, the likelihood of an adverse downstream effect may be 
reduced by the Affordable Care Act. Its Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) 
provisions mandate that insurers “spend at least 80%–85% of every 
premium dollar on consumer medical claims and activities that improve 
the quality of care.”155 Where this requirement is binding—where the 
insurer’s MLR is at or below the required floor—the insurer could not 
raise premiums to take advantage of the greater downstream market 
power it gained through a merger. 
The MLR requirements, however, are no panacea. They are a limited 
and sometimes perverse form of price regulation that may not help and 
sometimes may hurt consumers. The requirements are limited in three 
ways. First, they apply only to fully insured health plans.
156
 That creates 
a large lacuna since “more than half of privately-insured enrollees are in 
self-insured plans.”157 Second, the MLR requirements are floors, not 
ceilings, and thus do not prevent an insurer from raising premiums 
where it already exceeds the minima. A recent study by the 
Commonwealth Fund found that, on average, MLRs across the nation 
were above the floors.
158
 Third, the requirements, even where they are 
binding, do not preclude an insurer from restricting non-price 
competition. An insurer could reduce the size or prestige of its provider 
network or limit its spending on customer service while maintaining its 
MLRs.
159
 
The MLR provisions also create perverse incentives. When an MLR 
floor is binding, it becomes less profitable to invest in steps that reduce 
the costs of medical services. Suppose an insurer is considering 
developing a new payment system that would improve quality of care 
while lowering payments to providers. If the system is successful, it 
would reduce the insurer’s claims expenses, but that would diminish its 
MLR and force it to lower premiums, curtailing the return it could earn 
                                                     
155. Fuchs & Lee, supra note 32. These provisions apply to fully insured health plans and require 
that large group plans spend at least eighty-five percent of net premiums on medical services and 
quality improvement. For small group and individual plans, the minimum MLR is eighty percent. 
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 886 
(2010). 
156. See Health Insurance Industry Consolidation, supra note 153, at 14; Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act § 10101(f). 
157. Health Insurance Industry Consolidation, supra note 153, at 14. 
158. Id. (“[T]he non-profit Commonwealth Fund reports the following national MLRs for 2013: 
85.9% (individual); 83.6% (small group); 88.6% (large group).”). 
159. In other words, if an insurance company gained market power through a merger, but, 
because of the MLR requirements, could not raise premiums, the company could still take 
advantage of that power by spending less on efforts to improve quality. 
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on developing the new payment system. Similarly, if a merger enabled 
an insurance company to exert greater desirable buyer power 
(procompetitive countervailing power), the MLR requirements, if 
binding, would make it less profitable to exert that power, since lower 
provider payments would reduce the company’s MLR and diminish its 
profits. 
Thus, while the MLR provisions may limit the exercise of 
downstream market power, they would not apply in many instances and, 
when they do apply, would create a disincentive to curb payments to 
providers. Despite the MLR requirements, in short, many large insurance 
mergers may still pose a significant threat to competition and consumers. 
D.  Overall Assessment 
Some mergers of insurance companies may increase competition by 
enhancing buyer power. They may enable the merged firm to exert 
procompetitive countervailing power, lower excessive provider prices, 
and then pass on those lower prices to consumers in the form of lower 
co-pays and premiums. But a merger that is large enough to create 
significant buyer power could also create monopsony power, 
anticompetitive countervailing power, or downstream market power. 
Moreover, there appears to be no systematic evidence that all three 
forms of power are rare. To the contrary, none of the economic studies 
cited in this Article found that insurance mergers are likely to create 
procompetitive countervailing power without also creating offsetting or 
nearly offsetting downstream market power. As a result, it does not 
appear that mergers of large insurance companies are a generally 
attractive method of utilizing buyer power to control healthcare costs.
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CONCLUSION 
One of the major reasons why healthcare costs are higher in America 
                                                     
160. Some have raised yet another reason to prohibit large insurance company mergers: if 
insurers combine, providers will want to combine in response, potentially leading to a cascade of 
mergers and counter-mergers. But if a merger of health insurers was procompetitive, there would be 
no reason to allow providers to merge in response. Because a procompetitive health insurance 
merger would not create monopsony power or anticompetitive countervailing power, there would be 
no basis to resist the buyer power it would create. To be sure, a merger that produced 
procompetitive countervailing power might result in monopsony power in the future if some 
provider market were to deconcentrate, but that is unlikely. Providers today feel pressures to 
consolidate, not separate. See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, Health Law Speeds Merger Frenzy, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2015, at B1 (“Five years after the Affordable Care Act helped set off a 
health-care merger frenzy, the pace of consolidation is accelerating.”). 
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than in other countries is that our prices are exceptionally high. This 
Article addresses whether we ought to rely more heavily on buyer power 
to reduce those prices, as other nations do. It concludes that the 
country’s most powerful buyer, the federal government, should be 
allowed to negotiate the prices of prescription drugs used by Medicare. 
Unleashing the federal government’s buyer power is likely to reduce 
drug prices substantially without causing major adverse effects on new 
drug development or the array of medicines available to beneficiaries. In 
contrast, it would not be advantageous to encourage large insurance 
companies to merge to exert greater buyer power against hospitals or 
physicians. While some insurance mergers may be beneficial—and 
lower both excessive provider prices and premiums—most large mergers 
are likely to present significant competitive issues: they may well create 
one or more types of power (monopsony power, anticompetitive 
countervailing power, or downstream market power) that would render 
them anticompetitive on balance. 
In short, it appears more desirable to utilize the buyer power of the 
federal government than to magnify the buyer power of major health 
plans. That is so, in essence, because a profit maximizing health plan 
would exploit whatever anticompetitive power it gains through merger, 
harming small physician groups, for example, or forcing consumers to 
pay higher premiums. In contrast, whatever its drawbacks as a regulator, 
the federal government has no inherent incentive to exploit either small 
providers or consumers. This point, in combination with the 
government’s commanding buyer power, supplies another reason to 
consider moving the entire healthcare system to a single payer. 
 
